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Abstract
Medicare Part D began coverage of prescription drugs in 2006. Using data from the first year of the program
we found that Part D reduced pharmaceutical prices for Medicare recipients, with these effects driven by
enrollees previously without drug coverage. In this paper we extend our analysis through 2009, the fourth year
of the program, to investigate whether plans continued to extract price concessions in return for favorable
formulary placement, or if consumer inertia or other factors caused prices to bounce back after their initial
decline. We find price declines persisted through at least the third year of the program.
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Part D represents the largest expansion of 
Medicare since the program’s inception in 1965. 
Though initially projected to cost the federal 
government $780 billion over its first ten years 
(2006–2015), it has been running substantially 
under budget. This is due primarily to three fac-
tors. The first is that fewer new branded drugs 
have been invented and launched in the United 
States, with the result that an increasing frac-
tion of drugs consumed by the elderly are now 
available in inexpensive generic forms. Second, 
enrollees have tended to choose less gener-
ous plans than was forecasted by government 
actuaries. Thirdly, Part D is set up so that the 
government does not directly purchase drugs, 
but rather subsidizes participating private pre-
scription drug plans (PDPs), which then nego-
tiate with pharmaceutical companies over drug 
prices. The evidence provided in our previous 
work suggests that plans have been successful in 
negotiating lower prices for branded drugs and 
that this has also helped to contain the cost of the 
program (Duggan and Scott Morton 2010). In 
this paper we explore whether these price reduc-
tions persisted in the second, third, and fourth 
years of the program.
The pharmaceutical sales data that we use in 
this paper indicate that real retail pharmaceutical 
sales have been growing more slowly in recent 
years—by just 1.6 percent per year from 2006 
to 2009 versus 6.3 percent per year from 2001 
The Medium-Term Impact of Medicare Part D 
on Pharmaceutical Prices
By Mark G. Duggan and Fiona Scott Morton*
*Duggan: Department of Economics, University of 
Maryland, 3105 Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 20742 
(e-mail: duggan@econ.bsos.umd.edu); Scott Morton: Yale 
School of Management, Box 208200, New Haven, CT 
06520-8200 (e-mail: fiona.scottmorton@yale.edu). We are 
grateful to Merck and Co., and especially Anthony Recalde, 
for providing us IMS data, and to IMS for giving permis-
sion for us to use their data. We are also grateful to Wesley 
Yin for valuable suggestions. This project was supported by 
National Science Foundation Research Grant 0518858. The 
opinions contained herein are solely those of the authors. 
Copyright held by Mark Duggan and Fiona Scott Morton.
through 2006.1 This is a significant change, 
and it may be that Part D is helping to slow 
that growth, given Medicare recipients account 
for more than 40 percent of pharmaceutical 
spending. However, during this same three-year 
period, the average monthly premiums paid by 
Medicare recipients for Part D coverage rose 
by 8.3 percent annually, suggesting that the 
price reductions achieved in the first year of the 
program may not have persisted in subsequent 
years.
In our prior work, we showed that the insti-
tutions and mechanisms used by Part D plans 
strongly affect market outcomes. By institu-
tions, we have in mind large buyer groups, 
structured incentives for patients to consume 
certain products, and the development and use 
of formularies. A formulary is a mechanism 
that allows a buyer to identify a therapeutically 
 similar treatment as a viable substitute for a pat-
ented treatment, and then create price competi-
tion due to the ability to substitute away from 
the more expensive product. When bargaining 
with the seller of a patented product, the ability 
to shift demand to a substitute drug is a powerful 
negotiating tool.
Our previous research suggests that moving 
consumers from cash-paying status to member-
ship in a Part D plan lowers optimal prices for 
branded prescription drugs below what they oth-
erwise would be. This is to some extent surpris-
ing because the standard effect of insurance is 
to create inelastic demand and therefore elicit 
higher prices from a seller with market power 
(Duggan and Scott Morton 2006). Furthermore, 
our estimates reveal the effect is driven by the 
consumption of drugs by Medicare recipients 
without insurance before Part D. It appears to be 
the movement of Medicare recipients from cash-
paying uninsured status to insured under a plan 
1 Sales, price, and Part D premium data in all years are 
adjusted to 2009 dollars using the CPI-U. The June 2010 
CPI-U is used to adjust dollar values in both 2010 and 2011. 
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that causes the decline in per unit prices. The 
most plausible mechanism driving this result is 
not the insurance per se, but the activities of the 
insurer. The insurers that we study bundle insur-
ance with a formulary and other mechanisms to 
create elastic demand.
It is clearly important for policy decisions to 
determine if the effect on prices was temporary, 
or if society can continue to expect low prices in 
Part D due to the ongoing market pressure that 
plans place on branded pharmaceutical manufac-
turers. We explore this issue in the current paper. 
Our estimation strategy remains the same as in 
our previous work: we exploit variation across 
branded drugs in their prepolicy Medicare mar-
ket shares to estimate the effects of Part D on 
pharmaceutical prices.
I. Regulatory Environment and Theory2
Competition in Part D takes place fundamen-
tally at the level of the consumer. A Medicare 
recipient may choose to enroll in any plan 
offered in her region of the country. When mak-
ing this choice, the recipient would consider the 
plan’s monthly premium, the drugs included 
on the formulary, the prices of those drugs, and 
any other feature of the plan she values such as 
brand name or service quality. The plan bar-
gains with drug manufacturers over the prices at 
which it will purchase drugs on behalf of ben-
eficiaries, who then face out-of-pocket costs for 
those drugs as described in the plan rules. These 
price negotiations take place with manufacturers 
of branded treatments, who have market power 
due to their intellectual property (patent on the 
molecule).
To fix ideas, suppose that all Medicare enroll-
ees have no drug coverage prior to Part D and 
must pay cash for their prescription drugs, but 
then enroll in Part D when it begins. Notice 
that when this group paid cash for prescrip-
tion drugs, its members were not able to create 
effective price competition between molecules 
by threatening to switch to a therapeutic substi-
tute. However, once in Part D, these consumers 
were represented by a PDP. The result of the 
change in institutional structure is an increase in 
the cross-price elasticity of substitution for this 
2 See Duggan, Patrick Healy, and Scott Morton (2008) 
for a detailed description of Part D. 
group. For a number of common models of con-
sumer demand, as the elasticity of substitution 
rises and other factors remain constant, the opti-
mal price for the product falls. A second effect 
comes from the fact that the group is now sub-
sidized at 75 percent of the cost of the drug in 
the main coverage region and 95 percent in the 
catastrophic region. Sensitivity to price falls and 
this causes the optimal price to increase. Our 
earlier results demonstrate that the first effect 
dominated in 2006, the first year of the program.
While the regulations concerning the opera-
tion of Part D have not changed substantially 
since the start of the program (with respect to 
drug pricing and negotiation), one can imagine a 
number of reasons why pharmaceutical prices in 
Part D may have been unusually low in the first 
year. It may be that manufacturers initially set 
low prices to get preferable placement on for-
mularies, but as buyers became less price sen-
sitive they raised prices. The fact that average 
Medicare Part D premiums3 have gone up rap-
idly suggests that something like this may have 
occurred. The average annual increase from 
2006 to 2010 was 7.5 percent, with an especially 
large increase of 17.8 percent from 2008 to 2009 
(Jack Hoadley et al. 2010). It therefore seems 
plausible that the price reductions obtained in 
the first year of the program may not have per-
sisted in subsequent years.
On the other hand, if we think of the buyers 
of the branded drugs as the Part D plans rather 
than the ultimate consumers, it is not clear that 
buyers would become less price-sensitive over 
time. If consumers have developed switching 
costs across plans, this would give plans market 
power, but would not give the plan any reason to 
bargain less aggressively with the manufacturer. 
Consistent with this hypothesis is a recent study 
by the Kaiser Family Foundation that shows 
considerable variation across (popular) plans 
in the formulary placement of top brand-name 
drugs (Elizabeth Hargrave et al. 2010). Many 
drugs are preferred by a majority of plans, but 
are not on the formulary at all in other plans. 
Other drugs are preferred in only a minority of 
plans and have poor formulary placement in 
the others. These patterns suggest plans may 
3 These premiums cover just 25.5 percent of the cost of 
standard Part D coverage, with the federal government sub-
sidizing the rest. On the margin, however, consumers face 
the full cost of choosing more generous plans. 
VOL. 101 NO. 3 389ThE MEDIuM-TERM IMPACT Of MEDICARE PART D ON PhARMACEuTICAL PRICES
be obtaining price concessions in exchange for 
formulary placement. As there are theoretical 
reasons for prices to move in either direction, 
we provide analysis below to shed light on the 
question.
II. Pharmaceutical Sales Data and Constructing 
the Analysis Sample
We use data from 2005 to 2009 from IMS 
Health on total revenues and standardized units 
of each product (excluding sales to hospitals and 
long-term care facilities) in the United States for 
all pharmaceutical products in each year. This 
allows us to calculate the average price per day 
in each year for each product. When calculating 
average prices, we aggregate sales and quanti-
ties for all versions of the same drug in the year. 
Because our data run through 2009, we can esti-
mate the effect of Part D in its first four years.
We merge this IMS data on annual, product-
specific average prices to data from the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which is an 
annual dataset constructed by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) that 
includes detailed information on health care 
utilization for a representative sample of the 
 noninstitutionalized US population. Using the 
MEPS data, for each drug we calculate the frac-
tion of all prescriptions sold to Medicare recipi-
ents in 2002 and 2003, the two years just prior to 
the passage of the Medicare Modernization Act 
in December 2003. Approximately 40 percent 
of all prescriptions are dispensed to Medicare 
recipients in our two base years but the varia-
tion across drugs in this Medicare market share 
(MMS) is substantial.
Following our previous research on the 
impact of Medicare Part D (Duggan and Scott 
Morton 2010), we focus on the top 1,000 drugs 
in terms of total 2003 revenues. These treat-
ments account for more than 97 percent of all 
pharmaceutical sales in 2003, with this fraction 
declining over time, to 87 percent in 2006 and 
75 percent by 2009. This decline occurs because 
the sample excludes drugs that had not yet been 
introduced in 2003, and drugs with low initial 
sales that have high sales later in our study 
period. We then exclude drugs from the top 
1,000 that are generic, sold over the counter, or 
that do not appear in the 2002 or 2003 MEPS 
prescribed medicines file. This leaves us with a 
sample of 545 drugs that have strictly positive 
sales in 2006. These 545 drugs account for 77 
percent of total 2003 pharmaceutical sales, with 
this share also declining over time to 66 percent 
in 2006 and 55 percent by 2009.
One limitation of our focus on these top-
selling drugs from 2003 is that we will fail to 
capture any effects of Part D on relatively new 
products or products with low sales in 2003.
III. Identification Strategy and Empirical Results
Merging average prices with information 
from the MEPS on product-specific Medicare 
market shares, we estimate specifications of the 
following type:
(1) Δlog(Pj,t) = α1 + β1 MMSj,2003
 + μ1Yrsj,2003 
 + δ1AnyGenericj,2006
 + ε1 j,t ,
with j indexing drugs and Δlog(Pj,t) equal to 
the change in the log of the average price for 
drug j from 2005 to year t.4 In addition to the 
Medicare market share, this specification con-
trols for the presence of generic competition and 
for the number of years since the product was 
approved by the FDA, though our key estimates 
are not sensitive to the inclusion of these two 
variables. The coefficient estimate of particular 
interest is β1, which captures the average effect 
of Medicare Part D on pharmaceutical prices. 
Our key identifying assumption is that there 
are no unobserved factors correlated with the 
Medicare market share that also affect pharma-
ceutical price changes in our time period. By 
taking first differences of average prices, we 
remove any unobserved time-invariant differ-
ences across drugs. We further assume that any 
effects of Medicare Part D on average prices are 
4 Our earlier paper used one set of data sent to us by IMS 
for the 2001 through 2006 period. In this paper, we use a sec-
ond set of data sent to us by IMS for the 2005 through 2009 
period. During the three-year period between our receipt of 
the first and second sets of data, IMS made some changes to 
the data. Rather than using two different datasets with slight 
inconsistencies, we use this one dataset that was similarly 
constructed across all years considered. Thus, our base year 
is 2005 instead of 2003 as in our earlier paper. 
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driven by changes in the prices sold to Medicare 
recipients rather than prices in other segments of 
the market.5 To the extent that Part D plans suc-
ceeded in negotiating lower prices, the estimate 
for β1 would be negative.
It is worth emphasizing that our measure of 
Medicare market share represents the share of 
prescriptions sold to Medicare recipients before 
the start of Part D. Not all Medicare recipients 
are enrolled in Part D, and thus MMSj,2003 may 
be more appropriately thought of as poten-
tial Part D enrollment. Enrollment in Part D 
increased during our study period, from 22.6 
million in August 2006 to 27.0 million three 
years later, with this latter enrollment represent-
ing approximately 60 percent of all Medicare 
recipients. All else equal, this growth in Part D 
enrollment would potentially lead to an increas-
ing effect of MMSj,2003 over time.
Columns 1 through 4 of Table 1 display the 
coefficient on MMS in specifications for the four 
(average log) price changes from the base year to 
2006 to 2009. Consistent with our past work, we 
find a significantly negative effect of Medicare 
Part D in the first year of the program, as summa-
rized in column 2. More specifically, the estimate 
of −0.104 for β1, which is significant at the 5 
percent level, suggests that Medicare recipients 
experienced price reductions of approximately 
10 percent in the first year of the program relative 
to what they otherwise would have paid. The cor-
responding coefficient estimate from our earlier 
paper was almost identical.
In the second column we report the results 
from specifications with the two-year price 
change from 2005 to 2007. The estimate of 
5 Recent research by Darius Lakdawalla and Wesley Yin 
(2010) suggests that Part D increased the negotiating power 
of health insurers and allowed them to also negotiate lower 
prices for their non-Medicare recipients. 
−0.258 is more than twice as large as the one-
year price change and is significant at the 1 per-
cent level. This result provides evidence that 
there were additional price reductions obtained 
by Medicare Part D plans in the second year 
of the program, and that these were similar in 
magnitude to the declines in year one. In an 
analogous specification not reported here of the 
one-year price change from 2006 to 2007, the 
estimate for β1 is −0.155, which is significant at 
the 1 percent level.
In column 3 we show that the estimate for 
β1 in the specification of the three-year price 
change from 2005 to 2008 remains negative at 
−0.180. However, this estimate is not statisti-
cally significant. But the somewhat smaller 
magnitude of this point estimate suggests that 
there were no further reductions in prices in the 
third year of the program. In the fourth and final 
specification, the point estimate for β1 increases 
and is close to zero at just −0.010. However, 
given a standard error of 0.163, our estimates 
are compatible with a wide range of effects by 
the fourth year of the program. Additionally, the 
share of all pharmaceutical sales accounted for 
by our sample is quite low by this final year.
As in our previous paper, we next distinguish 
between Medicare recipients who already had 
drug coverage prior to Part D and their coun-
terparts on Medicare who were without this 
insurance by estimating specifications of the 
following type:
(2) Δlog(Pj,t) = α + β1MMS_Self j,2003
 + β2MMS_Insj,2003
 + μYrsj,2003
+ δ1AnyGenericj,2006 + εj,t.
Table 1—The Impact of Medicare Part D on Changes in Pharmaceutical Prices
2005–2006 2005–2007 2005–2008 2005–2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare market sharej,2003 −0.104** −0.258*** −0.180 −0.010
(0.045) (0.081) (0.132) (0.163)
Observations 545 545 537 529
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.
VOL. 101 NO. 3 391ThE MEDIuM-TERM IMPACT Of MEDICARE PART D ON PhARMACEuTICAL PRICES
In this regression, MMS_Selfj,2003 is the share of 
prescriptions dispensed to Medicare recipients 
who were without drug coverage in 2003, and 
MMS_Insj,2003 is the share dispensed to benefi-
ciaries with some drug coverage (thus, the two 
sum to MMSj,2003). Our earlier results demon-
strated that the price reductions were driven by 
this latter group.
Consistent with this, the first column of 
Table 2 shows that the estimated effect for 
“uninsured” Medicare recipients in the 2005 to 
2006 price change specification is significantly 
negative, while the corresponding estimate for 
their insured counterparts is much smaller in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant. This 
pattern persists in the subsequent specifications, 
with the estimate being twice as large through 
2007 and even greater through 2008, though the 
precision of the estimates declines as in Table 1. 
In all four cases, the estimate for β1 is negative, 
and in three cases it is statistically significant. 
In contrast, the estimate for β2 is positive in two 
specifications and negative in two specifications, 
and is not significant in any of them.6
These results suggest that the substantial price 
reductions for the uninsured that we estimated 
in the first year of Medicare Part D were even 
larger in the second and third years of the pro-
gram. However, the smaller negative coefficient 
that we estimate in year four suggests simply 
that the initial price reduction we estimated in 
2006 has persisted to 2009.
6 In the specification in which β1 is not significant, the 
p-value on the difference between β1 and β2 is 0.109. 
Table 2—Differentiating between Medicare Recipients 
with and without RX Insurance
2005–2006 2005–2007 2005–2008 2005–2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare self-pay sharej,2003 −0.144*** −0.278*** −0.372** −0.185
(0.046) (0.075) (0.179) (0.202)
Medicare insured sharej,2003 −0.015 −0.215 0.237 0.371
(0.097) (0.225) (0.233) (0.281)
Observations 545 545 537 529
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.
IV. Conclusions
Our findings in this paper indicate that the 
Part D plans succeeded in negotiating sub-
stantially lower prices for Medicare recipients 
through the first four years of the program. We 
estimate additional price declines in years two 
and three that appear to have been reversed in 
year four (2009), though we note that the preci-
sion of our results declines over time and thus 
we put less weight on these later estimates.
Our results indicate that the increase in Part D 
premiums during our study period is not driven 
by existing brands. One possible explanation is 
that newly released brands—brands that are not in 
our sample—are driving up the cost of Part D and 
leading to higher premiums. A second explana-
tion is that in later years of the program consum-
ers have a cost of switching plans and become 
less price-sensitive to premiums, and therefore 
plans have market power. If this explanation were 
the case, then premiums would be rising due to 
the market power of Part D plans, not the market 
power of pharmaceutical manufacturers. A third 
potential explanation is that Medicare recipients 
are gravitating toward more generous plans over 
time. Given the growing importance of Medicare 
Part D due to the aging of the baby boom gen-
eration and the changes in Part D resulting from 
the recent health reform legislation, more work in 
this area is clearly warranted.
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